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Abstract. In an atomic splittable flow over time game, finitely many
players route flow dynamically through a network, in which edges are
equipped with transit times, specifying the traversing time, and with
capacities, restricting flow rates. Infinitesimally small flow particles con-
trolled by the same player arrive at a constant rate at the player’s origin
and the player’s goal is to maximize the flow volume that arrives at the
player’s destination within a given time horizon. Hereby, the flow dynam-
ics described by the deterministic queuing model, i.e., flow of different
players merges perfectly, but excessive flow has to wait in a queue in
front of the bottle-neck. In order to determine Nash equilibria in such
games, the main challenge is to consider suitable definitions for the play-
ers’ strategies, which depend on the level of information the players re-
ceive throughout the game. For the most restricted version, in which the
players receive no information on the network state at all, we can show
that there is no Nash equilibrium in general, not even for networks with
only two edges. However, if the current edge congestions are provided
over time, the players can adopt their route choices dynamically. We
show that a profile of those strategies always lead to a unique feasible
flow over time. Hence, those atomic splittable flow over time games are
well-defined. For parallel-edge networks Nash equilibria exists and the
total flow arriving in time equals the value of a maximum flow over time
leading to a price of anarchy is 1.
Keywords: Flows Over Time · Deterministic Queuing · Atomic Split-
table Games · Equilibria · Traffic · Cooperation.
1 Introduction
In static routing problems, traffic is to be routed through a network at minimum
total cost. The cost or traveling time on each edge depends on its congestion.
However, the assumption that an optimal routing might be implemented by some
superordinate authority is not realistic in many settings. More likely, each net-
work participant selfishly chooses a path in order to minimize their own traveling
time. In general, the lack of coordination causes a higher total traveling time.
To quantify this decrease in performance, the total traveling time of a Wardrop
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equilibrium [39] is compared to the total traveling time of the system optimum.
The ratio between a worst equilibrium and the system optimum is the price of
anarchy [33]. This basic model can be extended in several ways. In this research
work we want to focus on two aspects.
The first aspect is the temporal dimension. Vehicles in real traffic need time
to move from the origin to the destination and the traveling time increases with
the degree of congestion, which varies over time. In other words, the traffic flow
does not traverse the network instantaneously, but progresses at a certain pace.
In addition, the effects of a routing decision in one part of the network take some
time to spread across the network as a whole. In order to mathematically model
this, we add a time component, transforming static flows into flows over time.
Here, every infinitesimally small flow particle needs time to traverse the network
and the flow rates of the edges are restricted by capacities. By assuming that
each particle acts selfishly, we can consider dynamic equilibria, which are called
Nash flows over time [26].
For the second aspect, note that in real-world traffic the activity of a single
road user has in most cases a negligible impact on the performance of the system
as a whole. Furthermore, the assumption of independent and selfish particles is
not justifiable in all applications: Networks where participants control a flow
of positive measure are not covered. For instance, in transportation networks
freight units might not act selfishly; they are controlled by freight companies
that each control a significant amount of traffic. This leads to the second aspect,
cooperative behavior among groups of network participants. To integrate this
into the mathematical model, flow particles are allowed to form coalitions. In
so-called atomic splittable routing games we consider a finite number of atomic
players (the coalitions), each controlling a positive amount of flow volume that
has to be routed through the network but can be split up and divided over
different routes.
In this paper we want to combine both aspects, as depicted in Figure 1. That
means, in contrast to Nash flows over time, sets of particles form coalitions which
will be represented by superordinate players. In contrast to atomic splittable
routing games, flow is modeled by a flow over time and players’ decisions might
be adapted to new situations. This extension covers a greater variety of scenarios.
For example, road traffic models in which most drivers are guided by navigation
systems (e.g. Google Maps, Here, TomTom, Garmin) can be modeled by covering
the strategic behavior of the firms: The decisions of a single driver do not have a
big impact on the city’s traffic, but Google Maps decisions do; and Here might
actually want to react. The situation will even intensify in the future with the rise
of autonomous driving, as the decision making process is shifted to the navigation
systems. We would like to point out that – in contrast to previous models – the
interests of navigation companies and the general public are assumably in line:
The cooperation of the users of a navigation system could reduce the average
driving time per company on the one hand and the driving time in general on
the other hand. This would lead to lower energy consumption, and therefore,
lower emissions of polluting substances.
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Fig. 1: Relationship between equilibrium situations in static routing games and
atomic splittable flow over time games
It turned out to be surprisingly challenging to consider equilibria in atomic
splittable flow over time games. For this reason the overall goal is to define a solid
model on these dynamic games and to present some preliminary observations, as
well as some non-trivial first results, which serve as a basis for further research.
Related work. Static network flows have been studied for quite a while. A lot
of pioneer work is due to Ford and Fulkerson, who also were the first to introduce
flows over time [15,16]. They provided an efficient algorithm for a maximum flow
over time, which sends the maximal flow volume from a source to a sink given a
finite time horizon. Closely related, a quickest flow minimizes the arrival time of
the latest particle for a given flow volume. This can be achieved by combining
the algorithm of Ford and Fulkerson with a binary search framework [6,14]. For
single-source and single-sink networks it is furthermore possible to construct a
flow over time that is maximal for all time horizons (and quickest for all flow
volumes) simultaneously. The existence of these so-called earliest arrival flows
was shown by Gale in 1959 [17]. They can be computed algorithmically by using
the successive shortest path algorithm in the residual networks [28]. For more
details and further references to literature on optimization problems in the flow
over time setting, we refer to the survey of Skutella [37].
Koch and Skutella [26] approach flows over time from a game theoretic per-
spective by introducing Nash flows over time. In their model, every infinitesi-
mally small flow particle is considered to be a player aiming to reach the common
destination as early as possible. As the flow rate entering an edge could exceed its
capacity, they considered the deterministic queuing model [38], which causes the
excess flow to wait in a queue in front of the bottle-neck. Existence and unique-
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ness of these dynamic equilibria were shown by Cominetti et al. [8]. Several other
aspects, including long term behavior, multi-terminals, spillback and price of an-
archy, were studied in recent years [3,9,10,12,34,35]. A slightly different approach
for user equilibria was presented by Graf et al. [18]. They use the same flow over
time model, except that particles do not anticipate the future evolution of the
flow, but instead choose quickest routes according to current waiting times. As
these delays may be subject to change, each particle can adopt its route choice
along the way.
Atomic splittable congestion games for static network flows can be described
as Wardrop equilibria [39] with coalitions [23,27]; see also the survey of Correa
and Stier-Moses [13]. For these games, Nash equilibria always exist, which can
be shown by standard fixed point techniques [30]. Altman et al. [1] showed
that equilibria are unique if the delay functions are polynomials of degree less
than 3. Regarding more general delay functions, Bhaskar et al. [4] showed that
for two players a unique equilibrium exists if, and only if, the network is a
generalized series-parallel graph. Harks and Timmermans [22] showed uniqueness
of equilibria when the players’ strategy space of the players has a bidirectional
flow polymatroid structure. Roughgarden [31] showed that the inefficiency of
a system decreases with an increasing degree of cooperation. He showed that
the price of anarchy for classes of traveling time functions in the atomic case is
bounded by the price of anarchy for the same class of functions in the nonatomic
case. Further research on the price of anarchy in static atomic splittable games is
due to Cominetti et al. [11], Harks [19], and Roughgarden and Schoppmann [32].
Computational-wise Cominetti et al. [11] showed that equilibria can be computed
efficiently when the cost functions are affine and player-independent. Regarding
player-specific affine costs, Harks and Timmermans [21] described a polynomial
algorithm for parallel-edge networks, and Bhaskar and Lolakapuri [5] presented
an exponential algorithm for general convex functions. Very recently, Klimm
and Warode showed that the computation with player-specific affine costs is
PPAD-complete for general networks [25].
We should also mention that the combination of cooperation and temporal
dimension has been considered for discrete packet routing games; see Peis et
al. [29]. Here each player controls a finite amount of packets, which has to be
routed through a network in discrete time steps. For more results on competitive
packet routing models we refer to Hoefer et al. [24] (continuous-time packets
model) and Harks et al. [20] (discrete-time packet model).
Contribution and overview. In Section 2, we introduce all notations and
formally describe atomic splittable flow over time games for general networks.
The players’ strategies determine how much flow they assign to each edge for
every point in time during the game depending on available information on the
current state. We consider two very natural sets of information. The first consists
solely of the current time. In Section 3 we show that this setting does not allow for
a Nash equilibrium in general, not even in a network with only two parallel edges.
This motivates to consider more complex information models. Hence, Section 4
is dedicated to the second set of information which additionally comprises the
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current congestion of the edges in form of the exit times. As the first main result
we show that every strategy profile results in a unique feasible flow over time
by formulating the conditions as initial value problem and applying the Picard-
Lindelo¨f theorem. For parallel-edge networks we show that Nash equilibria always
exist by explicitly stating a strategy profile. Since all Nash equilibria must have
the same objective equal to the system optimum the price of anarchy for those
networks is 1. Finally, we suggest further areas of research in Section 5.
2 Atomic Splittable Flow Over Time Games
In this section, we are going to properly define atomic splittable flow over time
games. The two main aspects are the multi-commodity flow dynamics (see [34])
and the players’ strategies, which depend on the information received over time.
Game setting. A network consists of a directed graph G = (V,E), where every
edge e ∈ E is equipped with a transit time τe > 0 and a capacity νe > 0. For an
atomic splittable flow over time game we consider a finite set of players P , each
with an origin-destination pair sj-tj and a supply rate dj > 0, as well as a time
horizon H > 0. We assume that sj can reach tj within the network.
The flow of player j enters the network via node sj at a rate of dj from time 0
onwards. The goal is to maximize the cumulative flow volume reaching node tj
before the end of the game at time H .
Flow dynamics. In the deterministic queuing model the total inflow rate into
an edge is bounded by the capacity. If the capacity is exceeded, a queue builds
up in which all entering particles have to wait in line. Afterwards each particle
needs τe time to traverse the edge before it can enter the next edge along the
path; see Figure 2. The dynamics of this process are formally defined as follows:
A flow over time is described by a family of Lebesgue-integrable functions
f = (f+, f−) = (f+e,j , f
−
e,j)e∈E,j∈P , where f
+
e,j , f
−
e,j : [0, H) → R≥0 denote the
rate at which flow controlled by player j enters and leaves edge e. The flow rates
summed over all players
∑
j∈P f
+
e,j(θ) and
∑
j∈P f
−
e,j(θ) are called total in- and
outflow rates. The cumulative in- and outflows, i.e., the amount of player j’s
flow that has entered or left an edge e up to time θ, is denoted by F+e,j(θ) =∫ θ
0
f+e,j(ϑ) dϑ and F
−
e,j(θ) =
∫ θ
0
f−e,j(ϑ) dϑ. Finally, f
+, f−, F+ and F− denote
the vectors of (cumulative) in- and outflows with one entry per edge-player-pair.
Such a family of functions f is a flow over time if the following two conditions
hold for all e ∈ E and j ∈ P :
Flow conservation is fulfilled for all θ ∈ [0, H):
∑
e∈δ+v
f+e,j(θ)−
∑
e∈δ−v
f−e,j(θ) =
{
dj for v = sj ,
0 for v ∈ V \ { sj, tj } .
(1)
Non-deficit constraints are satisfied for all θ ∈ [0, H − τe):
F+e,j(θ)− F
−
e,j(θ + τe) ≥ 0. (2)
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u v
∑
j∈P f
+
e,j(θ)
∑
j∈P f
−
e,j(θ)
ze(θ) νe
τe
Fig. 2: Representation of an edge in the deterministic queuing model: If more flow
particles enter edge e = uv within the total inflow rate
∑
j∈P f
+
e,j(θ) than its
capacity νe allows to process, they build up a queue, which current length is given
by ze(θ). Whenever the queue is non-empty the total outflow rate
∑
j∈P f
−
e,j(θ)
equals the capacity νe.
To track the net flow that is not yet processed and remains in the queue, we
introduce ze(θ) to denote the queue length at time θ. Formally, it is defined as
ze(θ) =
∑
j∈P F
+
e,j(θ) −
∑
j∈P F
−
e,j(θ + τe) for e ∈ E. For a feasible flow over
time we require that, whenever flow is waiting in the queue, the edge operates
at capacity rate. In other words, for all θ ∈ [0, H − τe) and e ∈ E, we require
∑
j∈P
f−e,j(θ + τe) =
{
νe if ze(θ) > 0,
min {
∑
j∈P f
+
e,j(θ), νe } else.
(3)
The waiting time qe(θ) experienced by a particle entering edge e at time θ
is generally defined as the time needed to process the flow present in the queue
when the particle enters it. In other words, it is the time span between its
entrance to and its exit from the queue just before traversing the edge. That is
qe(θ) := min

 q ≥ 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∫ θ+q
θ
∑
j∈P
f−e,j(ϑ+ τe) dϑ = ze(θ)

 = ze(θ)νe .
The exit time Te(θ) of a particle entering an edge e ∈ E at time θ is given
by the sum of the entrance time θ, its waiting time in the queue qe(θ) and the
transit time τe. Hence, we have
Te(θ) := θ +
ze(θ)
νe
+ τe.
Since ze can at most decrease at rate νe, it follows that q
′
e(θ) ≥ −1 and T
′
e(θ) ≥ 0,
which induces that Te is non-decreasing. Note that these derivatives exist for
almost all θ due to Lebesgue’s differentiation theorem.
Finally, in a feasible flow over time, the flow of different players should merge
fluidly, which means that a player’s share of the total outflow is set to her share
of the total inflow at the time it entered the edge. More precisely, we require
f−e,j(θ) =


f
+
e,j
(φ)
∑
j′∈P f
+
e,j′
(φ)
·
∑
j′∈P f
−
e,j′ (θ) if
∑
j′∈P f
+
e,j′ (φ) > 0,
0 else,
(4)
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for all θ ∈ [0, H) and φ := maxT−1e (θ). Here, we set f
+
e,j′(φ) := 0 for φ < 0.
Taking the maximum of T−1e (θ) simply ensures well-definedness which is required
since Te might not be strictly increasing.
To conclude we denote the set of all feasible flows over time by F , i.e., all
f = (f+, f−) that satisfy (1), (2), (3) and (4). As the outflow rates are uniquely
defined by the inflow rates, we refer to a feasible flow over time only by the
corresponding inflow f+, and write f+ ∈ F .
Atomic splittable flow over time games. Let ρj : F → R be the function
indicating player j’s payoff for a given f ∈ F , which is to be maximized. In
general, ρ can be set to various objective functions (e.g. arrival time of the
player’s latest particle or the average arrival time), but in this paper we will
focus on the maximum flow over time problem. Each player wants to maximize
her amount of flow routed from sj to tj before the end of the game at time H :
ρj(f) =
∑
e∈δ−tj
F−e,j(H)−
∑
e∈δ+tj
F+e,j(H).
We choose this maximum flow objective as it seems to be the most straight-
forward payoff-function. It is conceivable though, that most results might trans-
fer to quickest flow payoff-functions via a binary-search framework (cf. in non-
competitive settings quickest flows are constructed from maximum flows over
time via binary-search). But we leave this for future research.
The strategy space is a player’s set of viable options in order to maximize
her payoff. A single strategy is a complete instruction determining the player’s
inflow rates of all times and for all situations possibly occurring. Formally, the
strategy space of player j is a set of functions
Σj =
{
gj : I → [0, 1]
E
∣∣∣∣ ge,j is Lebesgue-integrable for all e ∈ E and∑
e∈δ+v
ge,j(I) = 1 for all I ∈ I, v ∈ V \ { tj }
}
,
where I is the set of information available to the players, which will usually be a
vector of real numbers. It is used to delineate what defines a situation and how it
is perceived by the players. The interpretation is as follows. For every information
I ∈ I, the value ge,j(I) determines which proportion of player j’s flow arriving
at v is distributed onto the outgoing edges e ∈ δ+v . We use proportions that sum
up to 1 instead of the inflow rates, as this easily ensures that flow conservation
is fulfilled at all times. Note that the received information I can depend on the
current time θ and on the flow over time f itself. As we normally do not want
the players to see the future, it should only depend on the flow over time up to
time θ. In general it might be player dependent, hence, we write Ij(θ, f).
In order to turn a strategy profile g = (gj)j∈P ∈×j∈P Σj into a feasible
flow over time f , we consider the following system of equations that has to be
8 A. Adamik and L. Sering
satisfied for all θ ∈ [0, H):
f+e,j(θ) = ge,j(Ij(θ, f)) ·
( ∑
e′∈δ−sj
f−e′,j(θ) + dj
)
for j ∈ P, e ∈ δ+sj ,
f+e,j(θ) = ge,j(Ij(θ, f)) ·
∑
e′∈δ−u
f−e′,j(θ) for j ∈ P, e = uv ∈ E \ (δ
+
sj
∪ δ+tj ),
f+e,j(θ) = 0 for j ∈ P, e ∈ δ
+
tj
.
(5)
Note that in order to keep it as simple as possible, we assume that flow of player j
reaching tj leaves the network immediately, hence, f
+
e,j(θ) = 0 for all e ∈ δ
+
tj
.
Since the inflow rates f+(θ) might depend on the flow over time itself up
to θ, it is not guaranteed that this system of equations yields a feasible flow
over time as solution. In fact, the key challenge is to find a reasonable set of
information I and strategy spaces Gj , such that, on the one hand, there exists
a unique (up to a null set) feasible flow over time satisfying (5) for every given
strategy profile g, and on the other hand, a Nash equilibrium exists. Note that
we only consider pure Nash equilibria.
In the following two section we discuss two very natural sets of information.
3 Temporal Information Only
First, we want to examine the simplest set of information, namely the current
point in time only: We set Ij(θ, f) := θ for all players j ∈ P . That means the
players do not receive any information about the current state of the flow, but
instead have to decide at the beginning of the game along which routes their
flow particles are routed. In this case it is guaranteed that there exists a unique
feasible flow over time that satisfies (5), as we can simply set f+e,j(θ) to the
right sides of (5) (formally this also follows from Theorem 2). However, Nash
equilibria do not exist in general, which is already true for very simple networks.
Theorem 1. With temporal information only, there exists no Nash equilibrium
in an atomic splittable flow over time game of two players p1 and p2 with identical
supply rates d1, d2>0, on a network with two identical parallel edges e1, e2 from
s (=sp1 =sp2) to t (= tp1 = tp2) with νe1 =νe2 < d1=d2 and τe1 =τe2 < H.
The key proof idea is the following. To every strategy of the opponent, a
player can choose a response strategy that yields a payoff of strictly more than
half the total optimum, i.e., the flow value of a maximum flow over time with
inflow rate d1 + d2. This can be achieved by first mirroring the opponent’s
strategy (copying the strategy but interchanging the roles of e1 and e2) and
then shifting some flow in the beginning of the game. This shift changes the
points in time ri when the last particles arriving at t just in time, enter edge ei
for i = 1, 2. As the new values rˆ1 and rˆ2 are not equal anymore the responding
player can modifying the inflow rates between rˆ1 and rˆ2 in order to squeeze in a
little more flow than the opponent, which will then be a little more than OPT /2.
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d1 = 4
d2 = 4
ν1 = 2
ν2 = 2
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τ1 = 1
τ2 = 1
H = 21
s t
(a) A parallel network with two identical edges and two identical players.
θ
f+(θ)
p2
p1
p1
p2
e2
e1
r2
r1 H
5 10 15 20
(b) Step 1: p1 mirrors p2’s strategy. We
have r1 = r2 = 10 and both queues build
up from θ = 0 onward. W.l.o.g., we have
f+1,2(θ) ≤ d2 = 4 for θ ∈ [10− ε, 10).
θ
fˆ+(θ)
p2
p1
p1
p2
e2
e1
rˆ1
rˆ2
H
5 10 15 20
(c) Step 2: p1 shifts δ flow units from e1
to e2 causing rˆ1 > 10 and rˆ2 < 10. By
pumping at maximum rate into e1 after
rˆ2 her payoff is ρˆ1 > 40 = OPT /2.
Fig. 3: Construction of a response strategy that always yields strictly more than
half of the total optimum in a network of two parallel edges. Here, ri and rˆi
denote the time when the last particles arriving at t just in time, enter ei.
As in turn the opponent can again choose a strategy with a payoff of more
than half the optimum, this immediately implies that a Nash equilibrium cannot
exist. This idea for the network given in Figure 3a is visualized in Figures 3b
and 3c and the formal proof can be found in the appendix on page 17.
4 Information on Exit Times
The absence of a Nash equilibrium for temporal information only was mainly
due to the theoretical information advantage of the deviating player. Player p1
can respond to p2’s strategy, while p2 does not see p1’s moves and is unable
to react. As it is very natural to require inter-player reactions over time, we
extend the information by the current congestion of the edges in form of the exit
times T (θ) := (Te(θ))e∈E . Formally, we define
Ij(θ, f) := (θ, T (θ)) ∈ I := [0, H)× R
E
≥0 for all j ∈ P.
The reason for choosing exit times over waiting times or queue sizes, which
both contain the same information about the congestion in the networks as the
exit times, is that the exit times are non-decreasing. As the exit time Te(θ) =
θ + τe +
1
νe
∑
j∈P
(
F+e,j(θ) − F
−
e,j(θ + τe)
)
depends directly on the cumulative
flows the equations system (5) becomes a system of differential equations. In
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order to show existence and uniqueness we use the Picard-Lindelo¨f theorem. For
this reason, we require the strategies to be locally Lipschitz-continuous from the
right in oder to ensure uniqueness. More formally, we say a strategy ge,j is right-
Lipschitz if for every I ∈ I there exists an L > 0 such that there exists an ε > 0
with |ge,j(I)− ge,j(I + x)| ≤ L · ‖x‖ for all x ∈ [0, ε]× [0, ε]E.
Existence and uniqueness. First we show, that in this setting every right-
Lipschitz strategy profile yields a unique feasible flow over time.
Theorem 2. For all right-Lipschitz strategy profiles g = (gj)j∈P of an atomic
splittable flow over time game with information on exit times, there exists a
unique feasible flow over time f+ satisfying (5).
Proof. We will construct the feasible flow over time satisfying (5) step by step
starting with the empty flow over time f+ ≡ 0 up to time 0. We define a re-
stricted flow over time on the interval [0, a) to be a vector of Lebesgue-integrable
functions (f+e,j)e∈E,j∈P , such that all flow conditions hold for all times in [0, a).
Suppose we are given a unique restricted feasible flow over time satisfying (5)
on the interval [0, a) for some a ∈ [0, H ]. If a = H , we are done. It is possible
to determine the queue lengths z(a) = (ze(a))e∈E , the waiting times q(a) =
(qe(a))e∈E and the exit times T (a) = (Te(a))e∈E based on f
+|[0,a). Hence, we
can also evaluate g(a, T (a)). In order to further extend the flow over time, we
specify an interval [a, b) ⊆ [0, H). The right endpoint b > a has to be small
enough to ensure that ge,j(θ, T (θ)) is Lipschitz-continuous for θ ∈ [a, b) and for
all e ∈ E and j ∈ P . We can find such b as all ge,j are right-Lipschitz, the exit
time functions Te are non-decreasing and continuous in θ.
We obtain the following initial value problem:
f+e,j(a) = ge,j(a, T (a)) · Cu(a),
f+e,j(θ) = ge,j(θ,
(
θ + τe′ +
1
νe′
∑
j′∈P
F+e′,j′ (θ)− F
−
e′,j′(θ + τe′ )
)
e′∈E
) · Cu(θ),
for all j ∈ P and e = uv ∈ E. Here Cu(θ) ≥ 0 is the total inflow rate into node u
except for t where it 0 (as stated in (5)). Since the transit times are strictly
positive Cu : [a, b) → R is completely determined by the restricted feasible flow
over time on [0, a) as long as b − a < τe. In addition, Cu is right-Lipschitz,
therefore, we can choose b small enough, such that Cu is Lipschitz-continuous
on [a, b). Furthermore, if qe(θ) > 0 we have that F
−
e′,j′(θ+ τe′) is also determined
from the past as long as b − a < qe(θ) or in the case of qe(θ) = 0, we have that
F−e′,j′ (θ + τe′) =
∑
j′∈P F
+
e′,j′(θ) as required by (2).
As the exit times T depend Lipschitz-continuous on F+ we have that the
right-side depend Lipschitz-continuous on F+, hence, the Picard-Linelo¨f theo-
rem guarantees the existence of a unique solution. It is easy to see, that extending
f by this solution yields a restricted feasible flow over time on [0, b). Flow con-
servation is fulfilled as
∑
e∈δ+v
ge,j(θ, T (θ)) = 1 and (2), (3) and (4) are satisfied
as we implicitly define the outflow rates accordingly.
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It remains to show that it is possible to repeat the process until we cover the
whole interval [0, H). Let bi, i = 1, 2, 3, . . . , be the right endpoints during this
extension process. The sequence might converge to lim
i→∞
bi = b∞ < H . Existence
and uniqueness are thus provided on [0, b∞). But this means, we can apply the
extension process for a = b∞. As we can always continue this process from a
limit point, we can apply this transfinite induction to obtain a unique feasible
flow over time on [0, H).
This theorem shows that we obtain a well-defined atomic splittable flow over
time game as long as we only consider strategies that are not too wild. It is worth
noting that right-Lipschitz functions can have infinitely many jumps and that we
cannot hope for much more general strategy-functions as argued in the following.
Suppose we allow for strategies that are not continuous from the right. We end
up with the following problem: Consider a game with only one player p1 and a
network consisting of two edges e1, e2 both from sp1 to tp1 and with νe1 < dp1 .
The strategy with ge1,p1(θ, T (θ)) = 1 if Te1(θ) ≤ θ+ τe1 and 0 otherwise, means,
that if there is no queue on e1 the players sends all its flow into e1 (which causes
a queue to build up) but if there is a positive queue she sends nothing (which
causes any positive queue to decrease). This strategy is not right-continuous in
T as ge1,1 switches from 1 to 0 as soon as T > τe1 + θ, and clearly, it cannot lead
to a feasible flow over time.
Existence of Nash equilibria in parallel-edge networks. Unfortunately,
the task to show the existence of a Nash equilibrium in this setting turns out
to be quite challenging. For this reason we only show the existence of Nash
equilibria for simple networks: For the remaining of this section we consider
parallel-edge networks with two nodes s = sj and t = tj , j ∈ P . We obtain
Σj =
{
gj : I → [0, dj]
E
∣∣∣∣ ge,j is right-Lipschitz for all e ∈ Eand ∑e∈E ge,j(I) = 1 for all I ∈ I
}
.
This leads to an “over time” version of atomic splittable singleton games as
they were studied in by Harks and Timmermans [21]. As an additional motiva-
tion, it is worth noting, that these restricted networks, become more meaningful
if, instead of a routing game, we consider a throughput-scheduling problem [36].
Suppose the edges represent machines on which competing players want to max-
imize their throughput. The jobs can run in parallel on multiple machines up to
some maximum rate of dj and each machine has a maximal service rate of νe
and individual time horizons H − τe. A very similar model without the game-
theoretical aspect is for example studied by Armony and Bambos [2].
In order to obtain a Nash equilibrium, it is worth noting that players do not
care on which edge their flow is sent, as long as it arrives at the destination
before H . To model a suitable strategy, we introduce the set of active edges
E′(T ) := { e ∈ E | Te < H } on which flow still arrives at t before H , depending
on the exit times. The resulting strategy for a player j ∈ P on edge e ∈ E could
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look as follows:
ge,j(θ, T ) :=


νe∑
e′∈E′(T )
νe′
if e ∈ E′(T ),
0 if E′(T ) 6= ∅ and e /∈ E′(T ),
νe∑
e′∈E
νe′
if E′(T ) = ∅.
(6)
The third case is not of importance for the player, as none of the flow sent into the
network will arrive in time anymore. As E′(T ) stays constant for small increases
of T , the same is true for ge,j . Since
∑
e∈E ge,j(θ, T ) = 1, we have gj ∈ Σj.
We will show that this strategy profile leads to a Nash equilibrium. For this
we first show in Lemma 1 that the given strategy profile leads to a total payoff
equal to the system optimum OPT (the value of a maximum flow over time with
inflow rate
∑
j∈P dj). Afterwards, we determine in Lemma 2 that the payoff for
each player given the strategy profile in (6) is a fixed share of the total payoff.
Finally, we argue that none of the players has an incentive to deviate from the
given strategy profile, since shares cannot be increased.
For the remaining of this section, let re be the point in time when the (first)
particle that arrives at t at time H enters edge e. Formally, re := minT
−1
e (H).
Hence, Te(θ) < H for any θ < re and Te(θ) ≥ H for any θ ≥ re.
Lemma 1. For the strategy profile given in (6) the sum of the payoffs of all
players equals the system optimum OPT.
The proof consists of a case distinction. If the total supply rate is larger or
equal to the summed edge capacities, the total inflow rates equal these capacities
and so do the inflow rates of a maximum flow over time. Otherwise the players’
flow rates are distributed so evenly that no queues are building up. As soon as
an edge become inactive at time θ = H − τe we can reduce the instance by
removing this edge and shifting the time by −θ. Up to this point the inflow into
the network was equal to the inflow of a maximum flow over time and all flow
arrived on time.
Lemma 2. For the strategy profile given in (6), the payoff of player j is given
by ρj = OPT ·dj/
(∑
j′∈P dj′
)
.
This follows very immediately as all players use the same strategy, which get
scaled by dj . Formal proofs of both lemmas can found in the appendix.
With these two lemmas we can finally prove the following theorem.
Theorem 3. The strategy profile (gj)j∈P given by (6) is a Nash equilibrium.
Proof. We want to observe what happens if one player j∗ deviates from her
strategy in an ex ante manner. W.l.o.g. we assume that E = 1, 2, . . . |E| ordered
by the times the edges become inactive, i.e., r0 := 0 ≤ r1 ≤ · · · ≤ r|E| ≤ H . In
other words, the edges leave E′(T (θ)) in ascending index order. Let e ∈ E some
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fixed edge and θ ∈ [0, re). Due to the definition of re, everything that is sent via
e up to time re actually reaches t before H . This is especially true for the flow of
some non-deviating player j ∈ P \ { j∗ } sent via e during [re′−1, re′) for e
′ ≤ e.
For θ ∈ [re′−1, re′ ) we have
f+e,j(θ) = dj · ge,j(θ, T (θ)) = dj ·
νe∑
eˆ≥e′ νeˆ
.
Up to time r|E|, a non-deviating player only chooses edges on which flow ar-
rives in time. After r|E|, no flow of any player reaches t in time anymore. That
means that all of the flow arriving at t in time started its way into the network
before r|E|. Player j’s share of the incoming stream into the network is at least
dj/
∑
j′∈P dj′ all along [0, r|E|), and as everything finds its way to t in time, her
share cannot be less in the total outflow.
Let us examine the outcome for the deviating player j∗. If she only chooses
edges e with e ≥ e′ during [re′−1, re′), all of her flow arrives in time too and her
share within the incoming steam is dj∗/
∑
j∈P dj as well. But if she sends flow
via some e < e′, she actually looses share in the outflow. Therefore, her share
is at most dj∗/
∑
j∈P dj . Since by Lemma 1 the total payoff equals the optimal
value OPT, player j∗ cannot increase her payoff by choosing a different strategy,
which shows that the strategy profile g is indeed a Nash equilibrium.
We observe the following: As long as the players constantly choose from the
set of active egdes and the summed payoff equals OPT, i.e., no queue runs dry
in case of a restricted network, the players’ payoffs stay the same. Hence, there
is a whole class of Nash equilibria. Next we want to show that this characterizes
all possible Nash equilibria, which implies that the price of anarchy is 1.
Theorem 4. For atomic splittable flow over time games on parallel-edge net-
works where exit times are provided as information with right-Lipschitz strate-
gies, the price of anarchy is 1.
Proof. The key observation is that every player j’s share of the total payoff∑
j′∈P ρj′ is at least dj/
∑
j′∈P dj′ as long as the player only sends flow into
active edges E′(T (θ)). Also, the total payoff is never decreased when a player
shifts inflow from an inactive edge to an active edge, since flow sent into inac-
tive edges does not arrive in time. Note here that due to the flow dynamics,
the cumulative outflow function of an edge depends non-decreasingly on the cu-
mulative inflow function of the edge (more precisely, F−j,e(θ) ≥ Fˆ
−
j,e(θ) for all
θ ∈ [0, H) if F+j,e(θ) ≥ Fˆ
+
j,e(θ) for all θ ∈ [0, H)). Suppose we have a strategy
profile g such that the total payoff
∑
j∈P ρj is strictly smaller than OPT. Either
one of the players’ shares of the total payoff is strictly less than dj/
∑
j′∈P dj′ ,
so this player can improve, or all players have a share of dj/
∑
j′∈P dj′ . But then
there has to be an edge e where flow is wasted, which means that the queue on e
is empty and the total inflow rate is strictly smaller than the capacity for a time
span of positive measure when e is still active; instead, flow is sent into inactive
edges or edges with a queue, which hinders later flow to get to t in time. Hence, j
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τ = 10
τ = 10
τ = 1
τ = 1
e1
e2
s1 s2
v1
v2
t
Fig. 4: A network with two non-symmetric players. We have t = t1 = t2. Player 1
must commit to a split of her inflow rate at time θ before knowing the relevant
information on the congestion on e1 and e2 at time θ + 10. Player 2 might use
this to her advantage, which could lead to the non-existence of Nash equilibria.
can improve by shifting flow from an inactive edge or edge with a queue, as this
increases the total payoff but does not decrease her share. Hence, in both cases g
was not a Nash equilibrium, which shows that the price of anarchy is 1.
5 Further Research
The topic opens up a multitude of further research directions. First of all, either
proving or disproving the existence of Nash equilibria for more general networks
for games with information on the exit times. As the exit times do not cover all
information that might be necessary for the players to react, a responding player
might have an advantage. This is especially critical in games with non-symmetric
players. To illustrate this difficulty consider the network in Figure 4.
For this reason an interesting research direction would be to identify more
general network classes for which a Nash equilibrium still exists. Symmetric
games where all players share the same origin and the same destination might
be a necessary restriction.
Additionally, the dependencies among different objective functions have not
yet been understood very well: Shedding light on whether the results for the
maximum flow over time objective translate to a quickest flow objective (maybe
via binary-search) would be very interesting. It might even be possible to consider
the average arrived flow or the average arrival time as payoff functions, which
could then be compared to an earliest arrival flow.
Finally, cooperative and non-cooperative models might be mixed in order to
assess how coalitions and selfish particles behave together (as e.g. in [7] for the
static case).
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A Technical Proofs
Theorem 1. With temporal information only, there exists no Nash equilibrium
in an atomic splittable flow over time game of two players p1 and p2 with identical
supply rates d1, d2>0, on a network with two identical parallel edges e1, e2 from
s (=sp1 =sp2) to t (= tp1 = tp2) with νe1 =νe2 < d1=d2 and τe1 =τe2 < H.
Proof. For the sake of simplicity we replace indexes ei by i and pj by j. E.g. f1,2
denotes the inflow rate function of p2 into e1. Furthermore, r1 and r2 denote the
points in time when the last particles arriving at t before H enter e1 and e2,
respectively. We will use a hat to denote parameters that have altered with the
change in strategy. For example, ρ will denote the initial and ρˆ the new payoff.
The optimal value of a maximum flow is OPT = ν1 · (H − τ1) + ν2 · (H − τ2).
We show that to every strategy of player p2, player p1 can choose a response
strategy that yields a payoff of strictly more than half the optimum. As in turn
p2 can again choose a strategy with a payoff of more than half the optimum, this
immediately implies that a Nash equilibrium cannot exist. To achieve this, player
p1 mirrors p2’s strategy. By this we mean that p1 has the same strategy as p2,
but the roles of the edges are interchanged. Figure 3b illustrates this behavior.
f+1,1(θ) = f
+
2,2(θ) and f
+
2,1(θ) = f
+
1,2(θ) for θ ∈ [0, H).
Both total inflow rates into the edges are equal and exceed the capacities,
i.e., f+1,1(θ) + f
+
1,2(θ) = f
+
2,1(θ) + f
+
2,2(θ) > ν1 = ν2 for θ ∈ [0, H). It is easy to
see that both payoffs are OPT /2. As capacities are exceeded, queues build up
from the very beginning. At time r1 = r2 = OPT /(d1 + d2) the last particles
that will reach t in time enter the network. The response strategy of p1 now
consists of reallocating a little flow to benefit from deferred rˆ1 and rˆ2: W.l.o.g.
let p2 send not more than half of her supply rate d2 at any time in [r1 − ε, r1)
for ε > 0, into e1. That means player p1 sends not less than half of d1 into e1. (If
no such ε exists, due to some crazy function behavior, one can consider averages
instead.) Player p1 reallocates some δ > 0 flow units from e1 to e2. By doing so,
rˆ2 is shifted to r2 −
δ
ν2
. Meanwhile we want that δ
ν2
≤ ε, that the δ flow units
are taken before time r2 − ε and that the queue of e1 is never empty for θ > 0.
Since there has to exist p1-flow of positive measure up to time r1 on e1 (in case
the only flow p1 sends into e1 is within [r1 − ε, r1) we can choose a smaller ε),
we can clearly set δ small enough to fulfill these conditions. As a result, rˆ1 is
postponed, i.e., rˆ1 > rˆ2. Conclusively, every flow sent until time rˆ2 reaches t
before H . Hence, the payoffs of both players belonging to [0, rˆ2) are equal. After
time rˆ2, player p1 can pump all her flow into e1, since it is still eligible to reach
t before H . See Figure 3c for an illustration. Therefore,
fˆ+1,1(θ) := d1
{
> d2/2 ≥ f
+
1,2(θ) θ ∈ [rˆ2, r1)
≥ f+1,2(θ) θ ≥ r1.
Hence, p1’s inflow rate into e1 is strictly greater than p2’s during a time period
of positive measure, which shows that the payoff of p1 is strictly larger than that
of p2. As the sum of the payoffs equals OPT we have that ρˆ1 > OPT /2.
18 A. Adamik and L. Sering
Lemma 1. For the strategy profile given in (6) the sum of the payoffs of all
players equals the system optimum OPT.
Proof. To prove this, we allow the network to have transit times that equal 0.
We split the set of instances into three cases
Case 1:
∑
j∈P dj ≥
∑
e∈E νe.
W.l.o.g. we assume τe < H ; otherwise the edge would be superfluous and could
be deleted. We have OPT =
∑
e∈E νe ·(H−τe) as shown in [37]. Since all players
route their flow proportionally to the capacities of the active edges, we have∑
j∈P
f+e,j(θ) =
νe∑
e′∈E′(T (θ)) νe′
·
∑
j∈P
dj ≥ νe for all θ with Te(θ) < H.
With this at hand, we can state the total outflow during the whole game:
∑
j∈P
ρj =
∑
e∈E
∑
j∈P
F−e,j(H) =
∑
e∈E
∫ H
0
∑
j∈P
f−e,j(θ) dθ
=
∑
e∈E
( ∫ τe
0
0 dθ +
∫ H
τe
νe dθ
)
=
∑
e∈E
(H − τe) · νe = OPT .
Case 2:
∑
j∈P dj <
∑
e∈E νe and τe = 0 for all e ∈ E.
We can easily see that OPT = H ·
∑
j∈P dj and∑
j∈J
f+e,j(θ) =
νe∑
e′∈E νe′
·
∑
j∈P
dj < νe for all θ < H.
Since no queues build up, all edges stay active for all θ ∈ [0, H). Therefore, it
holds that
∑
j∈P
ρj =
∑
e∈E
∫ H
0
∑
j∈P
f−e,j(θ) dθ =
∑
e∈E
∑
j∈P
H ·dj ·
νe∑
e′∈E νe′
= H ·
∑
j∈P
dj = OPT .
Case 3.
∑
j∈P dj <
∑
e∈E νe and there exists an e ∈ E with τe > 0.
We assume that τe < H for all e ∈ E. Let e∗ be the first edge to drop out of
E′(T (θ)), i.e., re∗ is minimal among all re. As in the first phase no queues build
up (see Case 2), we have re∗ = H− τe∗ , which means that τe∗ is maximal among
all τe. Emphasis should be put on the fact that the whole flow sent into the
network up to time re∗ arrives at t in time; a volume of
∑
j∈P dj · (H − τe∗) in
total. Hence, the system optimum cannot perform any better until re∗ . To show
that after time re∗ , the summed payoffs correspond to the system optimum as
well, we reduce the remaining instance. First, we remove e∗ from the set of edges,
i.e., Eˆ = E \ { e∗ }. Second, we shift the time axis re∗ time units back. By that
we mean that the new time 0 corresponds to re∗ in the former instance and
Hˆ = H − re∗ = τe∗ . Everything else remains untouched, in particular all queues
are empty at re∗ . This instance is strictly smaller, which means that eventually
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the reduction process must end because either we obtain
∑
j∈P dj ≥
∑
e∈Eˆ νe
(Case 1), τe = 0 for all e ∈ Eˆ (Case 2) or we reach |Eˆ| = 1 in which case the
total payoff trivially equals OPT.
Lemma 2. For the strategy profile given in (6), the payoff of player j is given
by ρj = OPT ·dj/
(∑
j′∈P dj′
)
.
Proof. For θ ∈ [0, re) we have
∑
j∈P f
+
e,j(θ) =
∑
j∈P dj · ge,j(θ, T (θ)) > 0.
We want to examine the outflow rates for φ ∈ [τe, H). With (4) and θ =
maxT−1e (φ) < re we obtain for all e ∈ E and j ∈ P that
f−e,j(φ) =
f+e,j(θ)∑
j′∈P f
+
e,j′(θ)
·
∑
j′∈P
f−e,j′ (φ)
=
dj · ge,j(θ, T (θ))∑
j′∈P
dj′ · ge,j′(θ, T (θ))
·
∑
j′∈P
f−e,j′(φ)
=
dj∑
j′∈P
dj′
·
∑
j′∈P
f−e,j′(φ).
Taking the integral over [0, H ], summing over all edges e ∈ E and using Lemma 1,
yields
ρj =
∑
e∈E
F−e,j(H) =
dj∑
j′∈P
dj′
·
∑
e∈E
∑
j′∈P
F−e,j′ (φ) =
dj∑
j′∈P
dj′
·OPT .
